In a series of influential papers, Larry Ribstein (2010 Ribstein ( , 2011 
There is no doubt that Ribstein's insights are powerful and important to understand current trends in the U.S. market for legal services. At the same time, a quick glance around the shows a wide variety of experiences and paths. All jurisdictions have been impacted by globalization in 5 Generally see Atienza (2012) . 6 Apparently some less prestigious law schools were in the business of allowing foreigners (in particular, Italians) to get a degree in law as a way to bypass regulations in their home countries. Notice the new bar exam is not supposed to test legal knowledge but rather lawyering skills and court structure. 7 For a while there was a discussion about the bar exam being regional (in particular, the possibility of distinct Catalan and Basque exams was considered). The Spanish authorities finally opted for a national exam.
Deliberation 3333-A/2009 (Ordem dos Advogados
). An initial decision by an administrative court declared the deliberation unlawful (March 2010) and later the Constitutional Court found it unconstitutional (January 2012). The Portuguese bar has promised to change the deliberation to comply with the judicial decisions while insisting that an entry exam is needed to assess legal knowledge. 9 Unsurprisingly, the President of the bar was reelected by a large majority in recognition of his work. legal services.
10 Not all deregulate. Many reregulate. Local markets for legal services around the world have contracted after 2008; however, these impacts have generated significantly different consequences. 11 As we will show in this article, the American experience with globalization does not reflect a general trend even if we limit our focus to the developed economies. Consequently, some of the recommendations and predictions suggested by Ribstein have to be understood in a broader context. Clearly American law firms and American legal education cannot ignore globalization. In point of fact, as Ribstein suggests, it is either globalize or perish. 12 Still, the other jurisdictions in this new wave of a globalized world are not statically waiting for the U.S.
market for legal services to change. They have followed their own pathways. Naturally, we can question Ribstein's important contribution in the context of this diversity of experiences.
The impact and possibilities of globalization cannot be correctly assessed in the absence of understanding the market for legal services. There is no such thing as a single market for legal services. The market is highly segmented between personal and corporate submarkets (Hadfield, 2000) . Such segmentation correlates significantly with litigation versus transactional lawyering.
It is also geographically dispersed given the asymmetric location of business and market opportunities.
The relative weight of the two segments of the market varies across the world. The distinction between personal and corporate submarkets has been quite well-defined in the U.S. for a while.
However, that is not the case in most markets for legal services around the world. In fact, a possible consequence of globalization in Europe, East Asia and Latin America has been the segmentation of the market for legal services and the emergence of a distinct corporate segment where U.S. law firms have operated quite successfully. 10 See, for example, discussion by Terry (2005) making similar observations about legal ethics in lawyering. More recently, see Terry, Mark and Gordon (2012a) on globalization of the legal profession.
11 Even in China, see Li and Liu (2012) . 12 For example, Wald (2012) is much less radical in his analysis of big law firms in the United States. Yet the author seems to assume that the decision whether or not to globalize is a prerogative of U.S. law firms independent of the rest of the world.
We contend that globalization, rather than inducing deregulation of the market for legal services, has promoted segmentation outside of the United States. The segmentation between corporate and personal markets around the world initially helped the expansion of big Anglo-American law firms in foreign jurisdictions. Yet, as local law firms adapt, these big law firms now face stiffer competition.
At the same time, segmentation to a large extent deters deregulation. Personal markets are largely local and immune to globalization. Moreover, if local law firms are seriously excluded from the corporate market, they might resort to reregulation in the personal segment to further exclude foreign competition from areas where they could be challenged (such as certain types of profitable personal injury or class action). In corporate markets, big law firms can bypass regulations when needed and it is therefore unclear why they should waste resources on lobbying for deregulation that will not generate significant gains. Big Anglo-American law firms might be interested in selected deregulation in foreign jurisdictions so to facilitate their business, but they do not generally enjoy a good position to force such change (precisely because they tend to lack strong local connections).
In Section II, we summarize the insights offered by Ribstein in his remarkable 2010 and 2011 articles and discuss the problems posed by globalization in the market for legal services. In Section III, we look at different jurisdictions and the way they have addressed these challenges.
In Section IV, we discuss the implications for globalization and deregulation. In Section V, we conclude.
II. Larry Ribstein's Theory of the Market for Legal Services and Globalization
In The Death of Big Law, Ribstein explains why big U.S. law firms can no longer survive. His argument is that the structure of big law firms follows a traditional model based on "reputational bonding" where additional fees pay reputational gains. In fact, he already pointed out some of the problems with this "reputational bonding" model in a previous article. 13 There, more than ten years ago, Ribstein argued that the old "reputational bonding" model could not deal effectively 13 See Ribstein (1998) , where the author discusses how law firm structure responds to agency costs. 14 As Ribstein correctly points out, big U.S. law firms had a better or superior production technology but, as added by Stephen (2013) , they lacked the adequate local knowledge.
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Consequently, two things happened. First, the progressive Americanization of many processes and client service activities, that is, legal services that were largely independent of local law, easily transplanted from U.S. legal markets and were better than the local offer back then.
Second, at the same time, joint ventures with local law firms were created in order to address local knowledge and information. Eventually, with time, these local law firms have improved their technology and, to a certain extent, have now less need for U.S. legal human capital in foreign markets.
14 Including U.K. law firms in Australia and Asia and Spanish law firms in Latin America.
15 By local knowledge I mean local law, local language and, more importantly, local reputation and connections. Anglo-American law firms can easily address local law and local language by hiring directly local human capital, but they are in disadvantage when it comes to local reputation and connections.
It is easy to understand that multijurisdictional law firms might be able to more efficiently combine American technology advantages with local knowledge. Nevertheless, they face serious impediments because legal activities are subject to licensing by individual jurisdictions.
Moreover, these regulations tend to favor local law firms and not multijurisdictional law firms.
For example, many jurisdictions insist on denomination in the local language which clearly raises the costs for foreign law firms. Joint ventures with local law firms were, in the context of regulatory restrictions, the best response.
The distinction between personal and corporate segments seems to matter in this context (Hadfield, 2000) . While such distinction has existed in the United States and is by now mature, it is relatively more recent around the world.
Similarly, litigation financing varies across the world. It is true that big U.S. law firms are fundamentally transactional and rely on international commercial arbitration, therefore the relevance of local courts to their business is reduced. Still, some significant segments of legal markets are naturally less exposed to globalization because of these variations in litigation financing. Legal aid, court imposed fees, or third-party insurance are different ways of organizing access to courts. Some of these forms can be easily captured by local interests and they can be difficult to overcome by foreign law firms. Coupled with regulation of legal services, they fundamentally shield the personal segment of the market from effective globalization.
Big law firms are exposed to two types of important clients: corporations and governments.
Corporations tend to be global clients. Governments are primarily local clients. When the latter generates more revenue than the former in legal fees, we have closed markets that cannot be easily penetrated by foreign law firms. In my view, this explains a significant contrast between the U.K. market, where corporate clients are overwhelming, and Southern Europe, where governmental and government-related clients play an important role.
16
16 Governments tend to rely on big Anglo-American law firms for international litigation or sovereign bond issuing. Here I focus on governments as local clients in reference, for example but not only, to administrative litigation or drafting legislation. The reality of course varies from country to country largely as a function of existing government lawyers (for example, Abogados del Estado in Spain) and the extension of government influence in the economy (for example, state owned companies).
importantly, we need to note that Ribstein has focused primarily on big law firms operating in the corporate segment around the world. In other words, his analysis of globalization applies to a particular segment of the market. Still, the role and structure of the corporate segment of the market for legal services varies across jurisdictions. Hence, generalizations from the U.S.
experience are risky and likely to be misleading.
III. Still, not surprisingly, it has opposed extensive deregulation and it has criticized the general policy of the European Commission in regard to forcing competition in lawyering. 26 Some jurisdictions have taken longer than others, but European law has forced the more traditional jurisdictions to open up their markets for legal services. It is possible that some of the European jurisdictions comply with this trend more de jure than de facto, using local practices and networks to undermine formal law. Still, the general pattern is undeniable. There is more competition in the lawyering business in Europe now than twenty years ago.
Notwithstanding, the U.K. is a notable exception. We can find significant reforms in the legal profession already during the 1980s under the Thatcher government, with Lord Mackay as Lord
Chancellor (Abel, 2003) . These reforms were deregulatory in nature and were broadly opposed by the legal profession (Abel, 2003; Stephen, 2013 (2000), where the Dutch competition authority decided that the prohibition of contingency fees violates competition law. There were later developments, but the prohibition still holds today. 25 As recognized by Terry (2009) and Lonbay (2012) . 26 See Garoupa (2008) . Notwithstanding, regulatory competition in Scotland has taken similar paths to that of England and Wales.
Therefore, we can easily say that the U.K. has now a much more powerful setup for regulatory competition than the U.S., as certainly noted by Ribstein. Hadfield (2008) Pinnington and Gray (2007) . 34 In fact, the Australian legal profession might suffer from a brain drain phenomenon to the extent that U.S. and U.K. law firms seem more attractive to the elite lawyers. There is no bar exam, and it has gradually become less arduous to be admitted to practice. Yet the best and brightest law graduates in Australia seek to take up places in top American and European law firms. 35 See Stephen (2008) . We follow closely his description of German legal markets. 36 Berufsordnung für Rechtsanwälte (BORA) enacted by the legal profession. The most important federal statute is Deutsches Richtergesetz (DRiG) that demands that every lawyer has to pass the official examinations for the professionalization of lawyering rather than following the more traditional model of lawyers as a formal body of the justice system. This had important implications for advertising, professional ethics, territorial limitations and, in time, legal fees. We should also recognize the active role of the German Constitutional Court in promoting deregulation by a series of decisions taken after 1987.
37 They impacted advertising, employment of lawyers by non-lawyers, fee arrangements, professional indemnity insurance and new forms of partnerships. German law firms were traditionally small (less than twenty lawyers), as is typical in Europe, but expanded a lot in the late 1990s as a consequence of mergers with Anglo-American law firms. Legal scholars have reported how the deregulatory and pro-competitive developments have taken place against the expressed feelings of the German legal profession.
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The particularly interesting case of British law firms in Germany has been studied in detail by Stephen (2002) . The author argues that Anglo-American law firms have a better production technology (reflecting a more competitive market for legal services in the U.K. than in Germany)
described as a more corporate-like business model. However, they lacked the local specific knowledge. Such an asset was an advantage for German law firms. Only mergers between
Anglo-American firms with better technology and German firms with more specific knowledge could internalize this conflict. At the same time, due to prevalent German regulation of lawyering (which allowed for multidisciplinary practices), international accounting and consulting firms promoted mergers with German law firms and seized a significant market share (mainly in the corporate segment of legal services). In fact, a decade later, Wenzler and Kwietniewska (2012) confirm that seven out of the ten largest law firms bear Anglo-American names but their legal practice is mainly German (both in substantive law and in local courts).
There is definitely an international flavor in Frankfurt, Hamburg or Berlin but mainly focused on German legal practice.
judiciary, the so-called "two state exams". Further details are regulated by each Länder with the Juristenausbildungsordnung (JAO). The federal statute that regulates legal practice is the Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung (BRAO). Traditionally, Germany was one of the most heavily constrained legal market. See, more generally, Brunnee (1992) , Klein (1993) , and Ostertag (1993) . 37 A more detailed discussion is available by Stephen (2013) . 38 See Stephen (2013) .
Although regulation of lawyering in France has been fundamentally statutory, the coexistence of multiple actors in the market for legal services was actually regulated in a significantly decentralized arrangement. 39 Traditionally, avocats had the exclusive right to plea before courts.
At the same time, there were avoués (mainly the equivalent to the British solicitors), notaires and agréés (in fact, non-lawyers with plea rights before commercial courts). Due to the lack of strict regulation applied to agréés, it has been observed they effectively evolved into conseils juridiques. 40 Stephen (2008) identifies two trends in regulatory action in French lawyering. First, the effort to limit or exclude multidisciplinary partnerships. Although initially successful, it got in trouble with the courts and the Cour de Cassation decided that some of the rules were against the law (by holding that only a statute could determine the extent to which ethics can be mandatory).
Second, the pressure to exclude Anglo-American law firms mainly from the Paris market. The main goal was to protect market shares and avoid the adulteration of French practices by the influence of Anglo-American production technology. Such policy has largely failed in the face of European law.
Italian governments have made an effort to deregulate the local market for legal services.
Innovations include the reform of traineeship (limiting the training period to eighteen months and the possibility of doing it while at law school) and the abolition of the tariffe (traditionally predetermined by the National Forensic Council with the Ministry of Justice). They were fiercely opposed by the legal profession and largely failed.
Spain has been previously indicated as the paramount example of reregulation. 52 A good summary of the discussion and new evidence is provided by Hoetker (2006, 2009 (2012) on the new bar examination in Japan, at 19-20. The numbers concerning passing rates seem to vary between thirty and forty-six percent. As to South Korea, the target passing rate announced by the Ministry of Justice was seventy-five percent. However, eighty-seven percent of the candidates passed in 2012. The old bar exam (for those under the previous system) is expected to remain until 2017. 57 A point discussed by Ramseyer (2011) and Matsui (2012) . 58 The extent to which legal education in Taiwan should follow the reforms in Japan and Korea has been intensively debated. In fact, the Taiwanese government promoted in 2005 to 2007 a reform effort inspired by the Japanese and Korean models that largely failed due to strong opposition among legal academics. New rules for judicial and bar exams were introduced in 2011. The bar passing rate is now up from around ten percent to around thirty-three percent; see Chen (2012) 63 See generally Philipsen (2010) , Cohen (2012) , Li and Liu (2012) , and Zhao and Hu (2012) .
64 Dasgupta (2010) describes the Indian experience as changing slowly, following the U.K. model but very closed to globalization. Ballakrishen (2012) provides a similar skeptical assessment with a focus on Indian lawyers with foreign legal education.
market for legal services in India promises a challenging opportunity for the future but, at the moment, it is largely untouched by recent global trends.
We cannot say we see a strong pattern of deregulation of legal services in East Asia and India. At best, most jurisdictions have been investing in improving the quality of their legal human capital.
Entry controls traditionally were severe (they still are in mainland China), thus failing to create a competitive market (perhaps with the exception of Hong Kong). Recent reforms might change this pattern in the future but, at this stage, their impact is unclear. Local commentators are divided on the merits of these reforms.
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Latin America has also been exposed to globalization in the market for legal services, but the pattern of reform and deregulation is remarkably weak at the moment. 67 For a general view, see Dezalay and Garth (2002) . Furthermore, Montoya (2010) does not provide an optimistic view of legal education reform in Latin America. Significant regulation and limited private initiative tend to prevail. In the specific case of Mexico, Pérez Hurtado (2010) notes a general concern, but little work to reform the provision of legal services has been done. 68 For example, in Brazil, technically even joint ventures are not allowed. Foreign law firms operate as "legal foreign consultants" (representações e consultoria em direito estrangeiro), which has raised considerable discussion. The Brazilian bar has largely regulated against any formal entry by foreign law firms; see http://www.estadao.com.br/noticias/impresso,o-cerco-aos-escritorios-estrangeiros,691486,0.htm (last checked August 27, 2012).
Spanish-speaking America has tended to follow the model without bar exam and only bar membership being required for lawyering. This has been challenged on the grounds of not inducing high quality legal professionals. 70 If successful, ensuing reforms will reregulate legal markets in South America.
Finally, consider the case of Russia. The corporate market is now dominated by Anglo-American law firms. The reason, in part, is the lack of regulation. Lawyering was strictly regulated during the Soviet times. In the 1990, the Law of the Russia Federation on Entrepreneurial Activity was enacted and foreign law firms used it to enter the Russian legal market and provide legal services, mainly in Moscow. There is no specific licensing, except for court representation in criminal matters (which requires membership of Russian bar). Civil and commercial matters do not require any specific arrangement; foreign lawyers can provide legal advice subject to mere registration.
IV. Globalization and Deregulation
Globalization and changes in the regulation of lawyering seem to go together. However, the experience around the world shows not always in the same direction. In certain jurisdictions, such as the U.K., major deregulation has followed globalization (in fact, more accurately, we could say that some deregulation proceeded globalization At the same time, the impact of ABSs has been significant in the personal segment of the market (personal injury, family, torts, etc.) and welfare law (including employment) which are largely outside the scope of activity of the big law firms. 79 These are areas of law that are less successful in generating capital (therefore, they benefit more from new sources of capital) and require new business models (with a more adequate organizational structure and making the most of economies of scale).
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It is clear that most of the insights from Ribstein apply to big law firms, but with a strong focus on the American legal market, for which it is unclear if the English LSA 2007 provides a good benchmark. As suggested by Stephen (2013) , the English LSA 2007 might be understood more as a competition framework for different business models in the market for legal services and less so as a new form of shaping self-regulation. We can understand global competition for lawyers (in terms of human capital) as well as for legal technology. One system seems to be superior in technology as well as in human capital formation and stocking. Not surprisingly, such a system has been very successful in the globalization age. Big U.S. law firms have been the main beneficiary, a process slowing down in the last couple of years, as noted by Ribstein, once foreign law firms have achieved a certain threshold in their learning curve.
The second noticeable dimension is the possible conflict between globalization benefiting big law firms and legal isolationism and local parochialism, both in the U.S. and elsewhere. This dichotomy has been much less analyzed. First, local knowledge and local language are important 80 Id. 81 In the sense of Ogus (1995) as pointed out by Stephen (2013) .
82 See Silver (2011 Another particularly important example is the success of the different "law and …" movements.
They are fundamentally American and of little influence elsewhere. In Garoupa and Ulen (2008) and Garoupa (2011) , I have explained why this is the case. In particular, the degree of parochialism in legal education, outside of the U.S. as well as within, reflects several realities.
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One is the extremely limited influence of American legal scholarship around the world (as compared to, for example, business or economic studies, not to mention hard sciences and technology). Another one is the utmost reduced presence of foreign legal scholarship in the American legal academia. Both realities slow down the practical effects of globalization and inevitably undermine many of the brilliant suggestions in Legal Education for the Twenty-First Century. They artificially enhance barriers that cannot be easily changed and presumably are time persistent.
V. Conclusions
As noted by Ribstein, changes in technology have allowed law firms to shift some legal services, primarily in the commodity end of legal work, to foreign jurisdictions with cheaper labor costs.
However, "this" globalization has hardly induced any significant competition and deregulation.
The personal segment of the market is largely local and untouched by globalization in almost every jurisdiction we have discussed in this article. Moreover, in a reaction to global competition in the corporate segment, local law firms pressure for reregulation in the personal segment.
The corporate segment of the market is dominated by large law firms that can easily bypass strict regulation and, at the same time, deter entry by foreign law firms. does not seem to be the answer to the structural shortcomings of the big law firms identified by Ribstein. In my view, the result is that the relationship between globalization and deregulation is much more nuanced and probably more problematic than suggested by Ribstein.
Around the world, the main consequence of the globalization of the market for legal services has been the segmentation between corporate and personal services rather than deregulation. We have argued that segmentation, in fact and paradoxically, reduces the pressure for deregulation.
The corporate segment is largely a creation of globalization. This has generated more competition and most probably cost-effective corporate legal services around the world.
However, these significant changes have not induced the kind of deregulation that legal economists think important for the adequate provision of legal services.
The corporate-personal market segmentation is inevitably endogenous to the technology.
Therefore, significant innovations caused by current globalization of corporate legal services might change future segmentation patterns. If so, we can easily understand reregulation trends as a sophisticated strategy to undermine those kinds of innovation or to avoid blurring the line between segments (for example, internet legal services that are now explicitly prohibited by recent bylaws in many jurisdictions).
